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dENNE~T LEASING CO., A UTAH
Corporation,
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vs.
REALTY INC., A Utah
Corporation, and RALPH WALKER,
an individual,
Defendants,Third
party Plantiffs and
Respondents,
vs.
~ALKER

Case No. 16458

~.K. KOMPUTER CORPORATION, A
c,')rporation,
Third party Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
Appeal from judgment of the First Judicial District
Jf the StRte of Utah, in and for the County of Cache
Honorable Venoy Christofferson, Judge
W. Scott Barrett
BARRETT & MATHEWS
300 South Main
Logan, Utah 84321
Attorney for Third Party
Plaintiff-Respondent
St pru:cn 1·1. "'cirr, Esq.

?O -2fith Street, .Suite 34
en, Utah 84401

2~

Attorney for Third Pa~ty
Gefeniant-Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
BENNETT LEASING CO., A Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
WALKER REALTY INC., A Utah
Corporation, and RALPH WALKER,
an individual,
Defendants, Third
Party Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
vs.
M.K. KOMPUTER CORPORATION, A
C'.lrporation,
Third Party
Defendant and
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16458

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants on a
lease agreement.
~.K.

Defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against

Komputer Corporation asking for indemnification if they

were found liable on the lease.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Third Party Plaintif'f-Respondants agree with the statement
of the disposition of the lower Court in the Third Party
Defendants brief with the additional statement that the judgment
of Bennett Leasing company has now been satisfied by Defendants
and Third Party Plaintiffs.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Third Party Plaintiff-Respondants ask that the
decision of the District Court be affirmed and that Respo ndants
be awarded damage;., and attorneys fees pursuant to the stipulations of the parties, the pleadings, and Rule 76(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure.
STATEMEN'r OF FAC.TS
Third Party Defendants-Appellant (hereinafter referred
to as M.K.) first contacted Third Party Plaintiff-Respondent
(hereinafter referred to as Walker) and induced Walker to
sign a purchase invoice for a computer machine.

(T.p. 7)

M.K. thereafter arranged the lease with Plaintiff Bennett.
(hereafter referred to as Bennett)
whatsoever with Walker.

Bennett had no contact

(T. p. 8, 37).

The M.K. salesman represented that there would be an
unconditional 90-day buy back agreement but that i t could not
be put in writing on the original purchasing agreement because
it had to go to Bennett and Bennett would not make the lease
under those conditions.

(T. pp-38-39).

However, the sales-

!Tian did write "90-day" on the sales invoice and this was construed by Mr. Morris, an officer of M.K. to mean that there 11as
a 90-day buy back guarantee. (T.p. 79).
Thereafter Walker wrote to ILK. and asked for a written
buy back agreement. (T. ppp. 66-67)

(Tl.ex.6).

Thereafter on

or about Hovember 11, 1977 the president of M.K. signed a
back agreement imposing numerous conditions.

bUY

An officer of

M.K. testified that this was delivered to Walker but he was not
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--asked to sign it.

Walker testified that he never saw the

written buy back agreement before the deposition of Mr. Morris
"':is taken.

(T.pp.43,62,96)

Walker also testified that there

were no conditions on the buy back guarantee except for payment
for time actually used.

(T. p. 44)

Thereafter Walker wrote numerous letters to M.K. none of
·11

hich were ever responded to in writing.

(T. pp.87, 173)

AalKer testified that even had he seen the written buy back
agreement prepared on November 11, 1977 he would not have
signed it because of the conditions stated therein in favor
of i·l, K.

( T. P. 175)

Although the written buy back agreement contained conditions favorable to M.K. their officers testified that ·even
though the buyers name was on it that he didn't have to sign
it unless he wanted to.

(T,pp. 138-139, 141).

After writing a letter on January 20, 1978 asking that
the machine be taken back by M.K. Walker received a phone call
from the president of M.K. agreeing to a 30-day extension of
the buy back.

(T.p. 173)

ARGUMENT
I
TEE GIST OF
.~ CLAIM FOR

THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IS BREACH OF CONTRACT AND
INDEMNIFICATION.

M.K.'s primary thrust in an attempt to get a reversal of the
~Jurts

judgment is that they were somehow deceived by the court

awarjing judgment on a different theory than stated in the Third
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Party Complaint.

This contention is frivolous and co,upletelJ

unsupported by the Third Party Complaint and Thfrd Party De.
fendants answer thereto.
An examination of the Third Party Complaint shows that
Walker entered into the lease agreements only with the under·standing that there was a 90-day termination guarantee,

~t

for that guarantee he would not have entered into a lease agr,.
!':lent.

Based upon that Walker pleaded that if he be required.

perform under the Lease agreement that he be awarded indemni:':.
cation damages against M.K.
There is an allegation in paragraph six of Third Party
Complaint alleging fraud for the purpose of claiming exemplar,
and punitive damages in the sum of $ 5, 000. 00

This paragrapn

was of no avail since the court awarded no such damages but
awarded only indemnification.
Despite the obvious contract pleading, M.K. in its brief
goes to great length to conteno that it went in trying to de:·:·
a fraud action and was not properly aware of the possibility'
losini; on a contract action.

That contention is contradicte~

M.K. 's answer to the Third Party Complaint.

In that answer"'

defense is: " Third Party Defendant alleges the defense of ~i:
performance under the contract." (emphasis added)
Even the M.K. brief under the heading "Nature of the Cas:
begins "This is an action based in contract where the Plainti:
respor1Jent purchased a computer ••• "
M.Y..'s contention that Walker recovered on a
pleaded is completely unsupporLed by the pleadings
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theory not
r the re:

The court awarded exactly the relief that was prayed for in
the Third Party Complaint i.e. that if Walker was required
to comply with the lease agreement that walker be indemnified
by judgment against M.K.

The only mention of fraud in the

Third Party Complaint is in connection with a request for punitive and exemplary damages which were not awarded by the court.
Thus, M.K.'s

~ontention

that Walker's judgment is based

exclusively on contract, while he pleaded only the tort of
fraud, is not correct.

In any event it is clear from the record

that the case was tried on the theory of contract and no
objection whatsoever was ever made at the trial by M.K. counsel.
Where a case is tried on the theory of a contract liability
it cannot be claimed 6n appeal that recovery should have been
allowed on the theory of tort liability.

5 Am Jur 2nd U5;

Stovall vs. Newell 158 Or. 208, 75 P. 2d 346.
A defect of the pleadings which might have been remedied
by an amendment if objection had been made cannot ordinarily
be complained of the first time on review, where there has been
a trial on the merits.

5 Am Jur 2nd 59.

Where a case has been

tried upon the theory that the issues involved therein were sufficiently raised by the pleadings, the insufficiency of the
pleadings in that respect cannot be urged in a reviewing court.
5 Am Jur 2nd 60; Idaho State Bank vs. Hooper Sugar, 74 Utah 24,

276 P. 659.
A pleading on which the decision to appeal from is based
will be liberally construed by the Appellate court in support of
the decision appealed from, especially where the pleading has not
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been objected to in the court below or the specific objection
raised on appeal has not been made in the court below.

5 Am Jur

2nd 316; Robins vs. Roberts 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d 340.
II

THE EVIDENCE IS MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S
FINDINGS.
M.K. argues in point 2 of the brief that there was insufficient evidence to support finding number 8.

In making that

argument M.K. assumes that its' written buy back agreement
binds Walker.

It was executed by its president but never execute

by Walker, nor even seen by Walker until after the trial had
commenced.

Thus, conditions imposed by M.K. unilaterally can

hardly determine whether or not Walker had complied with the
agreement.

There is considerable conflicting testimony on this

point but Walker's testimony

i~

clear and unequivocal.

And

was believed by the court.
Walker testified that he never saw the buy back agreement
before the Morris deposition taken after the litigation cornmencea,
(T. 43,62,69) Walker also said that there were no buy back

conditions stated by the salesman except that he would pay a pro·,
rate amount for the time the mactiine was actually used.

(T.p. ~•

Walker further stated that 1t was represented to him by M.K.
that they would buy the computer back if he was unhappy with it
for any reason (T. p. 54-55),
As a matter of law a written buy back agreement, never
communicated to the beneficiary of the agreement, which contains
con di t i'.Jns favorable to the guarantor cannot be binding on the
beneficiary.

It is therefore submitted that there was more than sufficier
evidence to support finding numher 8.
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III

WALKER SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY's FEES, DAMAGES AND COSTS.
In most jurisdiction the reviewing court may assess a
penalty or damages on finding that the appeal was taken
frivolously or for the purpose of hindering or delaying justice.
5 Am Jur 2nd 447.
(b)

This is specifically provided for in Rule 76

of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure where it is provided

that the court may award damages that may be just if it finds
that the appeal was taken for delay.
In some jurisdictions the award of attorney's fees on
appeal is within the discretion of the court hearing the appeal
and this applies in Utah.

5 Arn Jur 2nd 446; Swain vs. Salt Lake

Real Estate and Investment Company 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P. 2d 709.
Although the judgment of the court below is not clear on
whether or not Walker should have attorney's fees against M.K.
such fees were prayed for in the Third Party Complaint.

Further,

it was stipulated by all counsel that $1,000.00 was a reasonable
attorney's fees for the prevailing party or parties.

(T. p. 171)

This should be in addition to the judgment Bennett was
awarded against Walker plus $1,000.00 attorney's fees for
Bennetts' attorney.
While damages will not be awarded for delay where the
appeal was apparently taken in good faith, an appeal is
considered to have been taken for purposes of delay, where
there was no question of law involved and there was evidence
to sustain the judgrnen~.

5 Arn Jur 2nd 447; Texas and P.R. Co.

vs. Prater 229 U.S. 177, 57 Led 1139, 33 S. Ct. 637.

-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
I t is submitted that there is no fou-ndation in law

whatsoever for this appeal.

M.K. was fully aware of the

contractural nature of an indemnification claim which was
clearly set forth in the Third Party Complaint.

M.K. tried

the case on that theory and made no objections whatsoever to
the admission of evidence on the theory of breach of contract
and Walker's right to indemnification.
There is more than sufficient evidence to support all of
the findings of fact.
~1.K

The only lack of evidence urged

by

is conflicting evidence advanced by the M.K. witnesses

which conflict the trial court resolved in favor of Walker.
It is therfore respectfully submitted that the judgment
should be affirmed and that Walker should be entitled to damage:
and attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

DATED this

/J

, ,

day of February 1980.
,'

/,-.

\

~··

'G

~c:t _,_j2A'1Lii_

W. Scott Barrett
Attorney for Respondent,
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